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Introduction 
From the Ogoni people devastated by oil drilling in Nigeria to the Inuit and 
other indigenous populations threatened by climate change, communities 
disparately burdened by environmental degradation are increasingly framing 
their demands for environmental justice in the language of human rights.  
Domestic and international tribunals have concluded that failure to protect the 
environment may violate a variety of human rights (including the rights to life, 
health, property, and privacy; the collective rights of indigenous peoples to their 
ancestral lands and resources; and the right to a healthy environment). 
While the advantages and disadvantages of human rights-based approaches 
to environmental protection continue to be debated in the scholarly literature,1 
there is a dearth of research regarding the impact on North-South power 
relations of the evolving environmental human rights regime.2  Some scholars 
have questioned the utility of the human rights framework given the 
“diminished governance capacity of Third World states, which is the result of 
years of intervention by international law and international financial 
institutions.”3  They remind us that the lending practices of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as well as international trade and 
investment agreements have impaired the ability of Southern states to comply 
with human rights norms.4  Other scholars have expressed doubts about the 
ability of human rights law to adequately articulate and advance the aspirations 
and resistance strategies of diverse grassroots social justice movements, and 
 
1. See, e.g., Rebecca Bratspies, Do We Need a Human Right to a Healthy Environment?, 13 SANTA 
CLARA J. INT’L L. 31 (2015); Justice Susan Glazebrook, Human Rights and the Environment, 40 
VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 293 (2009); Alan Boyle, Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A 
Reassessment, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 471 (2007); Michael Burger, Bi-Polar and Polycentric 
Approaches to Human Rights and the Environment, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 371 (2003). 
2. This article uses the terms North and South to distinguish wealthy industrialized nations 
(including the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the members of the 
European Union) from the generally less prosperous nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. 
The global South shares a history of Northern economic and political domination that prompted 
Southern nations to join forces as a negotiating bloc (the Groups of 77 plus China) to demand 
greater equity in international trade law and international environmental law. The article 
recognizes the heterogeneity of the countries that comprise the global South; the existence of an 
elite economic and political class in the South (the North in the South), as well as socially and 
economically subordinated communities in the North (the South in the North); and  the growing 
South-South economic and environmental conflicts, including disagreements over climate policy 
and over foreign acquisition of Southern agricultural lands (the so-called “land grabs”).  
Nevertheless, the North-South framework remains a useful tool for mobilizing collective 
resistance to an international economic order that perpetuates poverty, inequality, and 
widespread environmental degradation. 
3. Penelope Simons, International Law’s Invisible Hand and the Future of Corporate Accountability 
for Violations of Human Rights, 3 J. HUM. RTS. & ENV’T 5, 40 (2012). 
4. Id. at 19-29, 40. 
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have warned about the susceptibility of the human rights discourse to 
cooptation by powerful states to advance their own economic and political 
interests.5  This article attempts to fill the gap in the scholarly literature by 
examining the promise and the peril of environmental human rights as a means 
of challenging environmental injustice within nations as well as the North-
South dimension of environmental injustice.6   
The article is divided into four parts.  Part I defines the term environmental 
justice, explains its application to environmental inequities within and between 
nations, and discusses the evolution of environmental human rights.  Part II 
examines the economic roots of environmental injustice from the colonial period 
to the present.  Part III analyzes the role of international law in justifying the 
conquest of nature and the subordination of non-European peoples. Part IV 
identifies the limitations of environmental human rights as a means of 
combating environmental injustice, and proposes ways of remedying these 
defects.  The article concludes that there is a tension between human rights 
discourse as an instrument of grassroots resistance and its appropriation by 
Northern states to reinforce North-South economic and political dominance. 
When human rights are incorporated into international legal instruments and 
institutions, they become embedded in structures that may constrain their 
transformative potential and reproduce North-South power imbalances. 
Scholars and practitioners should be mindful of these tensions in order to 
maximize the emancipatory potential of environmental human rights and to 
advocate effectively on behalf of disparately burdened nations and communities.   
 
5. See generally Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Counter-Hegemonic International Law: Re-thinking 
Human Rights and Development as a Third World Strategy, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 767 (2006) 
[hereinafter Rajagopal, Counter-Hegemonic International Law]; Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Culture, 
Resistance, and the Problems of Translating Human Rights, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 419 (2006) 
[hereinafter Rajagopal, Translating Human Rights]. 
6. For an introduction to the North-South dimension of environmental justice and its implications 
for international environmental law, international economic law, and international human rights 
law, see Carmen G. Gonzalez, Environmental Justice and International Environmental Law, in 
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 77, 78 (Shawkat Alam et al. 
eds., 2012) [hereinafter Gonzalez, Environmental Justice]. In examining the utility of 
environmental human rights as a means of resisting environmental injustice, this article owes an 
immense debt to the critiques of international law articulated by scholars associated with the 
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) movement. See generally Antony Anghie, 
What is TWAIL: Comment, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 39 (2000); James Gathii, TWAIL: A Brief 
History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative Bibliography, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 
26 (2011); Makau Mutua, What is TWAIL?, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 31 (2000); Obiora C. 
Okafor, Critical Third World Approaches to International Law: Theory, Methodology, or Both?, 10 
INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 371 (2008). 
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I. Environmental Justice and the North-South Divide 
Global economic activity exerts relentless pressure on the planet’s ecological 
systems and threatens the health and well-being of present and future 
generations.  Despite the proliferation of legal instruments to combat 
environmental degradation, the global economy continues to exploit natural 
resources at unsustainable rates while intensifying inequality within and 
among nations.7  
The leading cause of global environmental degradation is the profligate 
consumption of the planet’s resources by its wealthiest inhabitants, most of who 
reside in the global North or in the mega-cities of the global South.8  The richest 
twenty percent of the world’s population consumes roughly eighty percent of the 
planet’s economic output,9 and generates ninety percent of its hazardous 
waste.10  From colonialism to the present, the North’s appropriation of the 
South’s natural resources in order to fuel its economic expansion has generated 
harmful economic and environmental consequences, trapping Southern nations 
in vicious cycles of poverty and environmental degradation, and producing 
global environmental problems (such as climate change and biodiversity loss) 
that will constrain the development options of generations to come.11  Indeed, 
much of the ecological harm in the global South is due to export-oriented 
production rather than domestic consumption and to unsustainable natural 
resource exploitation by transnational corporations.12 
The adverse impacts of global environmental degradation are borne 
disproportionately by the planet’s most vulnerable human beings, including the 
rural and urban poor, racial and ethnic minorities, women, and indigenous 
 
7. Rep. of the U.N. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: 
Synthesis, 1-24 (2005), available at http://www.unep.org/maweb/documents/document.356. 
aspx.pdf; see also U. N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Trade and Development Report 2012, 31, 
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/TDR/2012 (2012) (observing that "economic inequality has re-emerged as a 
central policy concern due to rising global inequality over the course of the past three decades). 
8. See U.N. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, supra note 7, at 1-24. 
9. See William E. Rees & Laura Westra, When Consumption Does Violence: Can There be 
Sustainability and Environmental Justice in a Resource-Limited World?, in JUST 
SUSTAINABILITIES: DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 99, 110-12 (Julian Agyeman et al. eds., 
2003); DEVELOPMENT DATA GROUP, THE WORLD BANK, 2008 WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 4 
(2008), available at http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/wdi08.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 
2015).  
10. See DAVID N. PELLOW, RESISTING GLOBAL TOXICS: TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 8 (2007). 
11. See Gonzalez, Environmental Justice, supra note 6, at 80-84. 
12. See Rees & Westra, supra note 9, at 110; Julian Agyeman et al., Joined-up Thinking: Bringing 
Together Sustainability, Environmental Justice, and Equity, in JUST SUSTAINABILITIES: 
DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 1, 4. 
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peoples.13  In both the North and the South, the communities most burdened by 
crushing poverty, ill health, political disempowerment, and social exclusion are 
the ones most exposed to air and water pollution and most affected by climate 
change and other global environmental problems.14 
In the United States, the concentration of environmental hazards in low-
income communities and communities of color sparked a vibrant environmental 
justice movement dedicated to the defense of disparately impacted 
communities.15  Environmental justice activists have been at the forefront of 
struggles over the siting of hazardous industries in low-income communities of 
color; access to parks and open space; farmworker exposure to pesticides; 
inequities in disaster preparedness and emergency response; workplace health 
and safety; access to healthy and affordable food; and the enhancement of tribal 
regulatory authority over indigenous lands.16  
Environmental justice scholars and advocates identified four distinct aspects 
of environmental injustice experienced by historically marginalized 
communities.  They alleged (1) distributive injustice arising from 
disproportionate exposure to environmental hazards and limited access to 
environmental amenities, (2) procedural unfairness caused by exclusion from 
environmental decision-making, (3) corrective injustice due to inadequate 
enforcement of environmental legislation, and (4) social injustice because 
environmental degradation is inextricably intertwined with deeper structural 
ills, such as poverty and racism.17 
 
13. See Duncan McLaren, Environmental Space, Equity and the Ecological Debt, in JUST 
SUSTAINABILITIES: DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 19, 21; Gonzalez, Environmental 
Justice, supra note 6, at 78, 83-84, 96. 
14. See U.N. Dev. Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 2011: Sustainability and Equity: A 
Better Future for All, 4-8, 50-60 (2011), available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/ 
library/corporate/HDR/2011%20Global%20HDR/English/HDR_2011_EN_Complete.pdf; Rees & 
Westra, supra note 9, at 100. 
15. See LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND 
THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 19–33 (2001); Robert D. Bullard, 
Environmental Justice in the Twenty-First Century, in THE QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION 19, 19-25 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 2005). 
16. See Daniel R. Farber & Deborah McCarthy, Neo-Liberalism, Globalization and the Struggle for 
Ecological Democracy: Linking Sustainability and Environmental Justice, in JUST 
SUSTAINABILITIES: DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 38, 45-53; Carmen G. Gonzalez, 
Genetically Modified Organisms and Justice: The International Environmental Justice 
Implications of Biotechnology, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 583, 589-90 (2007) [hereinafter 
Gonzalez, Genetically Modified Organisms]; Alison Hope Alkon & Julian Agyeman, Introduction: 
The Food Movement as Polyculture, in CULTIVATING FOOD JUSTICE: RACE, CLASS AND 
SUSTAINABILITY 1, 4-10 (Alison Hope Alkon & Julian Agyeman eds., 2011); Dean B. Suagee, 
Tribal Self-Determination and Environmental Federalism: Cultural Values as a Force for 
Sustainability, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 229, 236-39 (1998). 
17. See Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10681, 10681-82, 
10688 (2000). 
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Environmental justice struggles are taking place in both the global North and 
global South.18  Among the most prominent are the struggles of the indigenous 
peoples of the Arctic and of the Pacific Islands for climate justice,19 the 
resistance of local and indigenous communities against environmentally 
devastating oil drilling,20 and the challenge by transnational agrarian 
movements (such as La Vía Campesina) to the corporate-dominated free trade 
policies that undermine rural livelihoods, exacerbate poverty and hunger, and 
degrade the environment.21 
Many scholars and legal practitioners have framed the demands of the 
environmental justice movements nationally and globally in the language of 
human rights.22  Although most human rights treaties do not explicitly 
recognize the right to a healthy environment, global and regional human rights 
tribunals have determined that inadequate environmental protection may 
violate the rights to life, health, food, water, property, privacy, and the collective 
rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and resources.23  Human 
rights violations caused by environmental degradation have been found to 
infringe the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; 
and the American Convention on Human Rights despite the absence of explicit 
environmental provisions in these treaties.24  In addition, three regional human 
rights treaties (the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the San 
Salvador Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Arab 
 
18. See GORDON WALKER, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: CONCEPTS, EVIDENCE, AND POLITICS 24-25 
(2012). 
19. See Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous People and Environmental Justice: The Impact of Climate Change, 
78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1625, 1633-46 (2007). 
20. See generally ANTHONY BEBBINGTON ET AL., SOCIAL CONFLICT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY: EVIDENCE FROM SOUTH AMERICA (Anthony Bebbington ed., 2012); 
PATRICIA I. VASQUEZ, OIL SPARKS IN THE AMAZON: LOCAL CONFLICTS, INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS, 
AND NATURAL RESOURCES (2014); Tunde Agbola & Moruf Alabi, Political Economy of Petroleum 
Development, Environmental Injustice and Selective Victimization: A Case Study of the Niger 
Delta Region of Nigeria, in JUST SUSTAINABILITIES: DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 269, 
269-88. 
21. See Philip McMichael, Peasants Make Their Own History, But Not Just as They Please, in 
TRANSNATIONAL AGRARIAN MOVEMENTS CONFRONTING GLOBALIZATION 37, 42-47 (Saturnino M. 
Borras Jr. et al. eds., 2008). 
22. See Agyeman et al., supra note 12, at 10-11. 
23. See John H. Knox, Climate Change and Human Rights Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 163, 168-78 (2009) 
[hereinafter Knox, Climate Change]; Dinah Shelton, The Environmental Jurisprudence of 
International Human Rights Tribunals, in LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1, 11-
12 (Romina Picolotti & Jorge Daniel Taillant eds., 2003). 
24. See SVITLANA KRAVCHENKO & JOHN E. BONINE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES, 
LAW AND POLICY 3-4 (2008). 
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Charter on Human Rights) and one human rights declaration (the ASEAN 
Declaration on Human Rights) include the substantive right to a healthy 
environment.25  Furthermore, the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters recognizes procedural environmental rights.26  For 
purposes of this article, the term environmental human rights refers collectively 
to the right to a healthy environment, procedural environmental rights, and the 
broad range of substantive human rights that may be violated by the failure to 
protect the environment.27 
The protection of environmental human rights by regional and international 
human rights institutions has prompted the incorporation of environmental 
human rights in national constitutions, legislation, and judicial decisions.28  
Currently, at least 147 national constitutions explicitly reference environmental 
rights and/or environmental responsibilities.29  Clearly, human rights law has 
been and continues to be an important weapon in the struggle for environmental 
justice. 
While environmental law scholars and practitioners have harnessed the 
power of human rights law to advocate for the individuals and communities that 
have been harmed by environmental degradation, North-South economic and 
political disparities pose significant challenges to the achievement of 
environmental justice within and between nations.30  North-South 
environmental inequities, like their domestic counterparts, manifest themselves 
in the form of distributive, procedural, corrective, and social injustice.  Although 
the North has contributed disproportionately to global environmental 
degradation and has reaped the associated economic benefits, the South 
 
25  See DAVID R. BOYD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS REVOLUTION: A GLOBAL STUDY OF 
CONSTITUTIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 84-88 (2012); ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration, ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS, art. 28 (Nov. 19, 2012), 
http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statement-communiques/item/asean-human-rights-declaration. 
26. See Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 517 (entered into force Oct. 
30, 2001). 
27. A comprehensive description of the substantive and procedural environmental human rights 
under existing international law is set forth in the 14 reports submitted to the UN Human Rights 
Council (UNHRC) by John Knox, the Independent Expert on Human Rights and the 
Environment. See Independent Expert, Report of the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human 
Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy, and Sustainable 
Environment: Mapping Report, submitted to U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/53 
(Dec. 30, 2013) (by John H. Knox) (summarizing the 14 reports on human rights and the 
environment). 
28. See BOYD, supra note 25, at 78, 106-07. 
29. Id. at 47. 
30. See Gonzalez, Environmental Justice, supra note 6, at 80-84. 
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experiences distributive injustice in the form of disparate exposure to 
environmental hazards. This disparity is due to the vulnerable geographic 
locations and limited regulatory capabilities of many Southern nations, the 
ongoing unsustainable extraction of the South’s natural resources to satisfy 
Northern consumers, and the transfer of polluting industry and hazardous 
wastes from the North to the South.31  North-South relations are also plagued 
by procedural injustice because the North dominates decision-making in the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and even in multilateral environmental and human rights 
treaty negotiations due to its greater economic and political influence.32  
Corrective injustice is perhaps most evident in the inability of small island 
nations to obtain redress for the imminent annihilation of their lands due to 
climate-change-induced sea level rise.33  Finally, North-South environmental 
conflicts are inextricably intertwined with colonialism and with post-colonial 
trade, aid, finance, and investment policies that impoverished Southern nations 
and enabled the North to exploit the South’s resources while externalizing the 
social and environmental costs.34   
An additional challenge to the achievement of environmental justice is the 
imperial legacy of international law.  From the colonial period to the present, 
international law has generated a series of doctrines that justified Northern 
political, economic, and military interventions in the South in order to achieve 
“civilization” or “development” in accordance with supposedly universal 
European norms.35  Human rights law is part of this tradition.  Human rights 
law is based on the natural law notion that human beings possess certain 
inalienable, permanent, and fundamental rights by virtue of their humanity, 
and that these universal rights “obtain in all places and at all times regardless 
of what the positive law provides.”36  Southern scholars have questioned the 
universal aspirations of human rights law in a multicultural world and have 
pointed out that international law has historically been used by the North to 
 
31. See RUCHI ANAND, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A NORTH-SOUTH DIMENSION 128-
30 (2004); WALKER, supra note 18, at 95-98; Carmen G. Gonzalez, Beyond Eco-Imperialism: An 
Environmental Justice Critique of Free Trade, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 981, 987-1000 (2001) 
[hereinafter Gonzalez, Beyond Eco-Imperialism]. 
32. See ANAND, supra note 31, at 132–33; PATRICK HOSSAY, UNSUSTAINABLE: A PRIMER FOR GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 191-98 (2006); RICHARD PEET, UNHOLY TRINITY: THE IMF, 
WORLD BANK AND WTO 200-04 (2003). 
33. See Maxine Burkett, Climate Reparations, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 509, 513-20 (2009). 
34. See Gonzalez, Genetically Modified Organisms, supra note 16, at 595-602. 
35. See generally ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2004) [hereinafter ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM]. 
36. DONALD K. ANTON & DINAH L. SHELTON, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 121 
(2011). 
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justify the conquest and dispossession of Southern peoples.37  Most recently, 
international law has been deployed to legitimize military intervention and 
economic reconstruction in places as diverse as Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan in furtherance of Northern economic and political interests.38  In 
the words of Makau Mutua, “[i]nternational human rights fall within the 
historical continuum of the European colonial project in which whites pose as 
the saviors of a benighted and savage non-European world.”39  
The remainder of this article will examine the economic roots of 
environmental injustice and the role of international law in the domination of 
nature and of non-European peoples in order to assess the emancipatory 
promise of environmental human rights law and discourse.  Rather than restate 
and supplement the existing scholarship on the advantages and disadvantages 
of human rights-based approaches to environmental protection, the article will 
serve as a cautionary note—reminding the reader that the discourse of human 
rights is embedded in a larger canon that has often disserved the interests of the 
global South and facilitated the pillage of the planet’s finite resources.   
II. The Colonial and Post-Colonial Origins of Environmental 
Injustice 
The roots of contemporary environmental injustice lie in colonialism.  The 
European colonization of Asia, Africa, and the Americas devastated indigenous 
societies and wreaked havoc on the flora and fauna of the colonized territories 
through logging, mining, and plantation agriculture.40  European colonization 
transformed self-sufficient subsistence economies into economic outposts of 
Europe that produced agricultural commodities, minerals and timber, and 
purchased manufactured goods.41  It also paved the way for contemporary social 
and economic inequality by dispossessing indigenous farmers, uprooting and 
enslaving millions of Africans, and importing indentured workers to provide 
cheap labor for their colonial overlords.42 
 
37. See UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 52 (2006). 
38. See Rajagopal, Counter-Hegemonic International Law, supra note 5, at 770-71; M. Sornarajah, 
Power and Justice: Third World Resistance in International Law, 2006 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 19, 46-
55. 
39. Makau Mutua, The Complexity of Universalism in Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS WITH 
MODESTY 51, 61 (András Sajó ed., 2004).  
40. See CLIVE PONTING, A GREEN HISTORY OF THE WORLD: THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE COLLAPSE OF 
GREAT CIVILIZATIONS 130-36 (1991). 
41. See id. at 194-212. 
42. See id. at 130-40, 196-99, 203-12. 
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The colonial enterprise was justified by notions of European cultural and 
racial superiority that persist, in one form or another, to the present day.  
Europeans regarded the native populations as inferior and asserted a moral 
obligation to “civilize” the “savages” by compelling them to abandon their local 
cultures and assimilate to European ways.43  In the post-colonial period, 
Southern elites, deeply influenced by Eurocentric ideologies, subjugated their 
own indigenous and minority populations in order to “modernize” and “develop” 
them.44  Despite the end of formal colonialism, the dismantling of apartheid, and 
the adoption of treaties prohibiting racial discrimination, racial hierarchies 
remain deeply entrenched in both the global North and the global South, as 
evidenced by, inter alia, widespread ethnic conflicts (including the genocide in 
Rwanda), the social and economic legacy of apartheid in South Africa, hate 
crimes against people of color and immigrants in Europe and the United States, 
and the subordination of Afro-descendant and indigenous populations in the 
Americas.45 
The achievement of political independence by the Latin American colonies in 
the 19th century and by the African and Asian colonies in the middle of the 20th 
century did not significantly alter the South’s crippling dependence on a world 
economy dominated by Europe and the United States.46  Because the terms of 
trade consistently favored manufactured goods over primary commodities, the 
nations of the global South found themselves on an economic treadmill that 
prevented them from obtaining the capital to diversify or industrialize their 
economies.47  Efforts to boost national earnings by increasing the production of 
 
43. See Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 903, 930-35 (1997). 
44. See ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, supra note 35, at 205-07; Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Indigenous Peoples 
and the State in Latin America: An Ongoing Debate, in MULTICULTURALISM IN LATIN AMERICA: 
INDIGENOUS RIGHTS, DIVERSITY, AND DEMOCRACY 24-26 (Rachel Sieder ed., 2002); Joel Ngugi, The 
Decolonization-Modernization Interface and the Plight of Indigenous Peoples in Post-Colonial 
Development Discourse in Africa, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 297, 324-26 (2002). 
45. See generally RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 
(2nd ed. 2012) (providing an introduction to study of racial hierarchies in the United States); 
TANYA KATERI HERNANDEZ, RACIAL SUBORDINATION IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE STATE, 
CUSTOMARY LAW, AND THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS RESPONSE (2013) (analyzing ethnic violence around 
the globe); DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE DEADLY ETHNIC RIOT (2001); PETER WADE, RACE AND 
ETHNICITY IN LATIN AMERICA (2nd ed. 2010) (examining the changing perspectives on blackness 
and indigeneity in Latin America); Hope Lewis, Transnational Dimensions of Racial Identity: 
Reflecting on Race, the Global Economy, and the Human Rights Movement at 60, 24 MD. J. INT’L 
L. 296, 298-99 (2009) (describing the advances and setbacks in the quest for racial justice over the 
past six decades). 
46. See PONTING, supra note 40, at 213-14. 
47. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Deconstructing the Mythology of Free Trade: Critical Reflections on 
Comparative Advantage. 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 65, 78-80 (2006) [hereinafter Gonzalez, 
Deconstructing the Mythology]. 
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minerals, timber, and agricultural commodities generally created a glut of 
primary commodities on global markets that depressed prices, reduced Southern 
export earnings, and only reinforced Southern economic vulnerability.48  The 
South’s economic dependency enabled the North to exploit Southern resources 
at prices that did not reflect the social and environmental consequences of 
export production.49  As historian Clive Ponting observes: 
Political and economic control of a large part of the world’s 
resources enabled the industrialized world to live beyond the 
constraints of its immediate resource base.  Raw materials were 
readily available for industrial development, food could be 
imported to supply a rapidly rising population and a vast 
increase in consumption formed the basis for the highest 
material standard of living ever achieved in the world.  Much of 
the price of that achievement was paid by the population of the 
Third World in the form of exploitation, poverty, and human 
suffering.50 
In the decades after the Second World War, the nations of the global South 
formed coalitions to reform the international economic system by passing 
resolutions at the United Nations General Assembly, where they held a 
numerical majority.51  They sought to assert control over their economic 
destinies by advancing the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources and the right to nationalize the Northern companies exploiting these 
resources.52  They mobilized to secure a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) that would enhance Southern participation in global governance and 
provide debt forgiveness, special trade preferences, and the stabilization of 
export prices for primary commodities.53  
 
48. PONTING, supra note 40, at 223. 
49. See JOAN MARTINEZ-ALIER, THE ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE POOR: A STUDY OF ECOLOGICAL 
CONFLICTS AND VALUATION 214 (2002).  Economist Joan Martinez-Alier refers to this trade among 
rich and poor countries as “ecologically unequal exchange,” which he defines as  
  [T]he fact of exporting products from poor regions and countries at prices that do not 
take into account local externalities caused by these exports or the exhaustion of 
natural resources in exchange for goods and services from richer countries. The concept 
focuses on the poverty and lack of political power of the exporting region, to emphasize 
the idea of lack of alternative options, in terms of exporting other renewable goods with 
lower local impacts. 
  Id.  
50. PONTING, supra note 40, at 223. 
51. See LAVANYA RAJAMANI, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-18 (2006). 
52. See Ruth Gordon & Jon H. Sylvester, Deconstructing Development, 22 WIS. INT’L L.J. 1, 53-56 
(2011). 
53. See RAJAMANI, supra note 51, at 17-18; Ruth Gordon, The Dawn of a New International Economic 
Order?, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 142-45 (2009) [hereinafter Gordon, The Dawn]; Gordon 
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The debt crisis of the 1980s hastened the demise of the NIEO and facilitated 
the rise of the free market economic model known as the Washington 
Consensus.54  In order to secure debt repayment assistance from the IMF and 
the World Bank, debtor nations in the global South were required to adopt a 
one-size-fits-all model of economic development that included deregulation, 
privatization, trade liberalization, slashing social safety nets, and the 
intensification of export production to service the foreign debt.55  These policies 
increased poverty and inequality; reinforced the South’s economically 
disadvantageous dependence on the export of raw materials; bankrupted small 
farmers by putting them in direct competition with highly subsidized 
transnational agribusiness; sharply accelerated rural-to-urban migration; and 
enabled transnational corporations to dominate many of the newly privatized 
economic sectors.56   
The export-driven economic reforms mandated by the IMF and the World 
Bank accelerated the North’s overconsumption of the planet’s resources by 
increasing the supply and driving down the price of agricultural products, 
minerals, and timber.57  Indebted, impoverished, and desperate for foreign 
capital, Southern nations also became a convenient dumping ground for 
hazardous wastes from the global North and a magnet for polluting industry, 
including the mining and petroleum extraction industries that had exploited the 
South’s resources for generations.58  Indeed, former World Bank chief economist 
Lawrence Summers wrote an infamous memorandum advocating the relocation 
of polluting industries from the North to the South.59  
Having industrialized by appropriating the South’s resources without regard 
to the environmental and social costs (including the release of greenhouse gases 
in the atmosphere), the North maintains an ecological footprint that dwarfs that 
of the South and has brought the planet’s ecosystems to the brink of collapse.60  
A country’s ecological footprint is the area of land and water required to produce 
 
54. See Gordon, The Dawn, supra note 53, at 145-50. 
55. Id.; Gonzalez, Environmental Justice, supra note 6, at 82. 
56. See Gonzalez, Environmental Justice, supra note 6, at 82. 
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58. See generally BRIAN C. BLACK, CRUDE REALITY: PETROLEUM IN WORLD HISTORY 43-66, 141-47, 
200-06 (2012); PELLOW, supra note 10. 
59. See Let Them Eat Pollution, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1992, at 66. The memorandum argued that 
the foregone income due to premature death and illness was less in lower-wage countries; that 
demand for a clean environment was lower in poor countries with high mortality; and that the 
marginal, incremental costs of pollution were lower in less contaminated areas (such as African 
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the resources it consumes and to assimilate the wastes it generates.61  While the 
average global per capita ecological footprint is 2.8 hectares, residents of the 
global North have an average per capita ecological footprint of 5 to 10 hectares.62  
By contrast, the South’s average per capita ecological footprint is less than one 
hectare, and even China has a per capita ecological footprint of only 1.2 
hectares.63   Although the planet possesses approximately 12 billion productive 
hectares, the human population’s total ecological footprint is almost 17 billion 
hectares.64  This means that we are exceeding the planet’s ecological carrying 
capacity, confirming that it is biophysically impossible for everyone in the world 
to enjoy the North’s consumption-driven lifestyle.  If we are to achieve 
sustainability and ensure an adequate standard of living for the world’s poor, it 
is essential for the North to scale back its overconsumption of the planet’s 
resources.65 
Scholars and activists have argued that the global North owes an ecological 
debt to the countries and peoples of the global South for centuries of economic 
exploitation, decades of ill-advised “development” programs, and consumption 
patterns that have devastated the planet’s ecosystems.66  The North incurred 
this debt through “resource plundering, unfair trade, environmental damage 
and the free occupation of environmental space to deposit waste”67 and through 
the displacement of Southern peoples and the destruction of their “natural 
heritage, culture and sources of sustenance.”68  Indeed, this ecological debt is 
one of the key manifestations of North-South environmental injustice.  Before 
examining the role of environmental human rights in addressing these 
inequities, it is essential to discuss the complicity of international law in the 
perpetuation of North-South inequality. 
III. International Law and the Peoples and Territories of the 
Global South 
International law played a prominent role in the subordination of the global 
South by providing the legal justification for the conquest of nature and of non-
 
61. See Rees & Westra, supra note 9, at 109. 
62. Id. at 110-11. 
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66. See McLaren, supra note 13, at 30-32; Karin Mickelson, Leading Toward a Level Playing Field, 
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European peoples.  Colonization and conquest were initially authorized by papal 
edicts from the time of the Crusades recognizing the right of Christians to seize 
the lands of non-Christians.69  Under the influence of the 16th century Spanish 
theologian and jurist Francisco de Vitoria, the justifications for the conquest 
shifted to natural law.  Vitoria argued that the indigenous peoples of the 
Americas were rational human beings bound by universal natural law and were 
therefore entitled to exercise ownership over their lands.70  However, because 
the Indians’ form of governance was deemed inferior to the universal (i.e., 
European) standard, it was appropriate for the Spanish to intervene in their 
affairs as guardians or trustees.71  Furthermore, if these “uncivilized” Indians 
violated natural law by refusing to allow the Spanish to travel on Indian lands, 
engage in commerce with them, or convert them to Christianity, then the 
Spanish were entitled to wage a “just war” against them, to enslave them, and 
to seize their lands.72  Writing a century after Vitoria, Hugo Grotius endorsed 
Vitoria’s conclusions, although he discarded the Christian mission as one of the 
justifications for a just war.73  
The emergence of independent nation-states in Europe following the 1648 
Treaty of Westphalia (which ended the Thirty Years’ War and diminished the 
power of the Roman Catholic Church) produced new legal justifications for the 
colonial enterprise.74  The 18th century Swiss diplomat Emmerich de Vattel 
declared that states represented the highest form of human association and 
were entitled to territorial integrity, exclusive jurisdiction over their internal 
affairs, and freedom from external intervention.75  However, Vattel, like his 
predecessors, adopted Eurocentric models of the nation-state that excluded 
indigenous peoples.76  Vattel proclaimed that peoples organized primarily along 
tribal or kinship lines without hierarchical, centralized authority and exclusive 
territorial domains were not entitled to the benefits of statehood and were 
therefore subject to conquest.77  Vattel’s writings also provided the intellectual 
justification for the doctrine of terra nullius, which was used extensively by the 
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(Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrence eds., 1991); Antony Anghie, The Evolution of International 
Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 739, 742–43 (2006) [hereinafter 
Anghie, The Evolution of International Law]. 
71. See Anghie, The Evolution of International Law, supra note 70, at 743. 
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European colonizers to dispossess nomadic hunter-gatherer societies on the 
ground that failure to cultivate the land rendered their territories “vacant” and 
therefore subject to appropriation by European invaders.78 
In the 19th century, the apogee of colonialism, prominent legal scholars 
adopted explicitly racial and cultural criteria to designate certain states as 
civilized and therefore sovereign, and certain other states as uncivilized and 
therefore non-sovereign.79  As Antony Anghie explains, “all non-European 
societies, regardless of whether they were regarded as completely primitive or 
relatively advanced, were outside the sphere of law, and European society 
provided the model which all societies had to follow if they were to progress.”80  
Acceptance into the family of nations required non-European states to transform 
their domestic legal systems and their methods of conducting foreign affairs to 
comport with European norms.81  
International law was deeply influenced by scholars and philosophers of the 
European Enlightenment, who regarded non-European societies as “trapped in a 
state of nature,” and believed that the conquest of nature and the development 
of industry were key duties of all civilized nations.82  John Westlake, a 
prominent 19th century international lawyer, argued that the division of the 
colonized territories among European nations was necessary to avoid armed 
conflict among civilized (white) states in their inevitable competition for the 
resources occupied by uncivilized (non-white) “natives.”83  His rationale was as 
follows: 
The inflow of the white race cannot be stopped where there is 
land to cultivate, ore to be mined, commerce to be developed, 
sport to enjoy, curiosity to be satisfied.  If any fanatical admirer 
of savage life argued that whites ought to be kept out, he would 
only be driven to the same conclusion by another route, for a 
government on the spot would be necessary to keep them out.  
Accordingly, international law has to treat such natives as 
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uncivilized.  It regulates, for the mutual benefit of civilized 
states, the claims which they make to sovereignty over the 
region, and leaves the treatment of the natives to the conscience 
of the state to which sovereignty is awarded, rather than 
sanction their interest being made an excuse the more for war 
between civilized claimants, devastating the region and the 
cause of suffering to the natives themselves.84  
In short, international law rendered European cultural norms universal and 
justified European domination of nature and of non-European territories and 
peoples.  In accordance with Westlake’s logic, the European powers divided up 
the African continent after the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 in order to avoid 
open warfare among European states in their scramble for African colonies.85  
The European practice of drawing territorial boundaries without regard to the 
complex cultures and political organizations of African societies laid the 
groundwork for many of the conflicts that plague the African continent to this 
day.86 
In the aftermath of the First World War, the League of Nations devised 
economic criteria to justify the continuation of the colonial enterprise.87  Instead 
of relying on racial and cultural criteria, the League distinguished between the 
“advanced” nations of Europe and the “backward” territories to authorize the 
ongoing international supervision of the colonies of the defeated Ottoman 
Empire and Germany.88  These “backward peoples” were placed under the 
tutelage of the League’s Mandate Powers (generally Britain and France) until 
they were transformed into modern states capable of self-government.89  The 
techniques developed under the Mandate System to supervise, measure, 
manage, and control the progress of the “backward territories” would later be re-
deployed by the IMF and the World Bank to perpetuate systems of Northern 
domination of the global South in furtherance of yet another iteration of the 
North’s “civilizing mission.”90 
After the Second World War, decolonization movements in the global South 
significantly altered the composition of the United Nations, and enabled the 
newly independent states to articulate legal doctrines designed to protect and 
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enhance their hard-won sovereignty, including the collective right of all peoples 
to self-determination, the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, and the right to development.91  As North-South struggles shifted to 
international economic law, the South introduced new legal principles, such as 
the principle of special but differential treatment in international trade law, 
designed to reduce North-South economic disparities by providing more 
favorable treatment to Southern nations.92  Differential treatment was also 
incorporated into international environmental law through the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibility, which imposes asymmetrical 
obligations on Northern and Southern states in recognition of the North’s 
disproportionate contribution to global environmental degradation and its 
greater technological and financial resources.93  The principle was 
operationalized in several treaties, including the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (which contains differential phase-out 
schedules for ozone-depleting substances for Northern and Southern countries) 
and the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (which exempts Southern nations from binding emission 
reduction obligations).94 
Despite these innovations, Southern aspirations for a more equitable 
international order were thwarted by the hegemony of Northern economic 
development models premised on material accumulation, control of nature, 
unlimited economic growth, and rejection of indigenous knowledge, practices, 
and beliefs as obstacles to “modernization.”95  Rather than providing reparations 
for the harm caused by colonialism, the global North, in the decades following 
the Second World War, ascribed Southern poverty to “underdevelopment,” and 
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offered scientific and technical assistance to enable the South to “catch up.”96  
Development was portrayed as a universal aspiration and measured in 
Northern economic terms—primarily gross national product (GNP), later 
supplemented by reduction in poverty, hunger, and disease.97  Encouraged to 
borrow money from Northern commercial banks to finance development 
projects, Southern states sought IMF and World Bank assistance when 
skyrocketing interest rates and spiking oil prices brought these debtor nations 
to the brink of default.98  As a condition of debt relief, the IMF and the World 
Bank required debtor nations to implement structural adjustment programs 
that exacerbated poverty and inequality in the global South.99  These programs 
required, inter alia, drastic cuts in government spending that deprived 
vulnerable populations of access to education, health care, and other social 
services, and sparked widespread popular protests.100  Beginning in the 1990s, 
the World Bank responded to its critics by expanding its intervention in the 
global South to encompass poverty alleviation, environmental management, and 
a variety of rule of law programs designed to create a favorable climate for 
foreign investment.101  In short, the development discourse justified the North’s 
continuing intervention in the South and promoted the consumption-oriented 
lifestyle of the United States as the new standard of civilization to which all 
should aspire.102 
Underlying the civilized/uncivilized, advanced/backward, and 
developed/developing dichotomy was the Eurocentric notion that civilization and 
humanity are measured by a society’s distance from nature—by its willingness 
to control nature through science and technology to serve human ends.103  
Communities that engage in subsistence production, resist wage labor, or 
disdain the accumulation of material wealth were pronounced uncivilized and in 
need of development.104  Development was deemed to require the 
commoditization of nature (private property) and human activity (labor), ever-
increasing material consumption, international commerce, and continuous 
economic growth.105  Even sustainable development, the centerpiece of 
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contemporary global environmental law and policy, was incorporated by the 
North into the dominant development paradigm by treating environmental 
protection as a technical problem that could be addressed through better 
planning and engineering.106  The Northern ideology of nature as a resource to 
be dominated for the satisfaction of human needs was exported to the South and 
often supplanted more complex cultural traditions that viewed humans and 
nature as inherently interdependent.107 
Ironically, the IMF and the World Bank used the language of human rights 
(the promotion of “good governance”) to justify policies designed to further a 
neoliberal economic agenda.108  Like “development,” good governance possesses 
universal appeal rooted in notions of democracy, accountability, transparency, 
and participation.109  However, the good governance framework attributed 
Southern “underdevelopment” to deficiencies in Southern states rather than to 
the legacy of colonialism or the failure of the economic reforms imposed through 
structural adjustment, and thereby legitimated the intensification of Northern 
neoliberal interventions.110  Barred by their respective Articles of Agreement 
from interfering in politics, the IMF and the World Bank embraced those human 
rights compatible with their economic and financial mandates (such as ensuring 
debt repayment by promoting economic growth through privatization and 
deregulation).111  The primary goal of the good governance initiatives became 
the reform of law, the judiciary, and the public sector in order to promote 
economic liberalization.112  Like the free market reforms designed to produce 
“development,” good governance was deployed as yet another tool to manage and 
transform Southern nations so as to further Northern economic interests.113  
The human rights framework created to protect the dignity and intrinsic worth 
of human beings was “steadily supplanted by a trade-friendly, market-friendly, 
human rights paradigm” that facilitated the enforcement of contracts and the 
protection of private property for the benefit of global capital.114  Instead of 
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reforming the fundamental structures of the international economy to empower 
the global South and reduce inequality, the “good governance” initiatives 
emphasized the need to reform “backward” developing countries and further 
entrenched the power of the IMF and the World Bank on terms that were 
largely disadvantageous to the global South.115 
The end of the Cold War and the rise of U.S. hegemony in international 
affairs inaugurated a new role for international human rights law—legitimating 
Northern military intervention in Southern nations for ostensibly humanitarian 
purposes.116  United States-led interventions in Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan were justified as efforts to promote democratic governance, protect 
human rights, and/or combat terrorism.117  Like the colonial era civilizing 
mission to Christianize the “savages,” these interventions were premised on the 
legitimacy of using military force to discipline “failed” or “rogue” states.118  The 
North thereby reproduced the human rights narrative of the white savior 
“taming” or “civilizing” savage or despotic Southern states in order to rescue 
“backward” peoples who cannot help themselves.119 This narrative cloaks 
Northern foreign policy interests in the language of humanitarianism and 
demonstrates yet again the tenuous sovereignty of Southern nations.120 
The legitimacy of these “humanitarian” interventions was called into question 
by the complicity of the North in the perpetuation of violence and poverty in the 
global South.  As Thomas Pogge points out: 
As ordinary citizens of the rich countries, we are deeply 
implicated in these harms.  We authorize our firms to acquire 
natural resources from tyrants and we protect their property 
rights in resources so acquired.  We purchase what our firms 
produce out of such resources and thereby encourage them to act 
as authorized . . . .  We also authorize and encourage other firms 
of ours to sell to the tyrants what they need to stay in power—
from aircraft and arms to surveillance and torture equipment.121 
Critics also emphasized that military interventions “solve little or nothing, and 
in a remarkable number of cases seem only to increase the instability of a 
country and a region, as well as the misery of masses of people.”122  Finally, 
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some observers pointed out that the ultimate objective of many of these 
interventions appeared to be economic reconstruction of the invaded states 
along neoliberal economic lines.123 
Transnational corporations headquartered in the North and rapacious 
Southern elites have been the prime beneficiaries of Northern economic, 
political, and military interventions in the global South in order to impose 
market-friendly economic reforms.124  From the oil drilling operations of 
Chevron/Texaco in Ecuador to the mining activities of Freeport-McMoran in 
Indonesia, transnational corporations (and their counterparts in certain 
emerging Southern nations) are frequently embroiled in some of the worst 
human rights and environmental abuses.125  Far from defending the rights of 
their citizens, post-colonial states often pursue socially and environmentally 
destructive development strategies and ruthlessly repress grassroots resistance 
movements.126  Eager to secure foreign investment, Southern governments often 
strive to create a friendly environment for foreign capital by entering into one-
sided bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and host state government 
agreements (HGAs) that protect the property rights of the foreign investor and 
restrict the ability of Southern states to regulate in the public interest.  These 
agreements generally do not impose any corresponding duties on the foreign 
investor to comply with human rights or environmental standards or obligate 
the investor’s home state to regulate the extraterritorial conduct of its 
corporations.127  As Upendra Baxi observes: 
A progressive state [under contemporary globalization] is one 
that protects global capital against political instability and 
market failures.  A progressive state is one that represents 
accountability not so much directly to its people, but one that 
offers itself as a good pupil to the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund.  A progressive state is one, which instead of 
promoting world visions of a just international order, learns the 
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126. See MICHELINE R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE 
GLOBALIZATION ERA 338-39 (2004); Agbola & Alabi, supra note 20, at 281-85 (describing the 
repression of grassroots environmental movements in Nigeria). 
127. See Simons, supra note 3, at 15–19; Sornarajah, supra note 38, at 29-33. 
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virtue of debt repayment on schedule.  Moreover, a progressive 
state is now one which is required to garner conceptions of good 
governance neither from the histories of struggles against 
colonization and imperialism nor from its internal social and 
human rights movements but from the shifting prescriptions of 
the global institutional gurus of globalization.128  
IV. Can Environmental Human Rights Promote Environmental 
Justice? 
Environmental human rights hold immense promise for historically 
subordinated communities as a tool of mobilization against their governments’ 
abuses of nature and of vulnerable populations.  The language of human rights 
is morally compelling, and suggests that human rights should, in theory, trump 
other, less weighty considerations (such as economic efficiency).129  Unlike 
international environmental law, human rights law imposes obligations on 
states for harms that are purely domestic, and enables victims of substantive 
and procedural human rights violations to enforce these rights through citizen 
complaint mechanisms, thereby exposing human rights violations to 
international scrutiny.130   
However, environmental human rights must be approached not as an object 
of veneration, but as one instrument in the pursuit of environmental justice that 
has both advantages and disadvantages.  There is an important distinction 
between the bottom-up environmental human rights discourse deployed by 
grassroots environmental justice movements and the top-down incorporation of 
environmental human rights in treaties and other legal instruments. Once 
human rights are institutionalized in the international human rights system, 
they become embedded in pre-existing relations of power that generally favor 
Northern states and transnational corporations. While institutionalization is 
necessary for the implementation of environmental human rights, scholars and 
advocates must identify and challenge practices and policies that compromise 
their effectiveness.  Rather than reiterate the excellent work of other scholars on 
 
128. BAXI, supra note 37, at 291. 
129. See LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 4 (1990); BURNS H. WESTON & DAVID BOLLIER, GREEN 
GOVERNANCE: ECOLOGICAL SURVIVAL, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE LAW OF THE COMMONS 88-89 
(2013); Carmen G. Gonzalez, An Environmental Justice Critique of Comparative Advantage: 
Indigenous Peoples, Trade Policy, and the Mexican Neoliberal Economic Reforms, 32 U. PA. J. 
INT’L L. 723, 776-78 (2011) [hereinafter Gonzalez, Critique]. 
130. See Gonzalez, Environmental Justice, supra note 6, at 86; Shelton, supra note 23, at 1–2; see also 
Bratspies, supra note 1, at 45-48 (discussing the limitations of environmental treaties as a means 
of responding to environmental challenges). 
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the benefits of an environmental human rights framework,131 this section draws 
upon Parts II and III of this article to examine its limitations and to consider 
how it might evolve to realize its emancipatory promise.  
International human rights law and institutions were created by a small 
group of states in the aftermath of the Second World War when most African 
and Asian nations were under colonial domination.132  Critics of the 
international human rights system argue that the human rights canon 
generally favors civil and political rights over economic, social, and cultural 
rights; elevates individual rights over collective rights; and implicitly regards 
Western-style liberal democracy as the only legitimate form of government.133  
In order to avoid universalizing yet another Eurocentric model, it is essential to 
expose the Northern biases of the human rights corpus, infuse it with Southern 
conceptions of human dignity, and transform it so as to challenge the 
inequitable economic order that perpetuates the subordination of the global 
South and the abuse of nature and of historically marginalized communities.  
The remainder of this section will identify seven limitations of the human rights 
canon, discuss the implications for environmental human rights, and propose 
ways of enhancing the ability of environmental human rights law and advocacy 
to challenge environmental injustice. 
A. False Universalism that Cloaks Northern Domination 
International human rights law (environmental or otherwise) is problematic 
to the extent that it presents itself as neutral, universal, apolitical, non-
ideological, timeless, and eternal134—thereby obscuring the historic inequities 
that gave rise to anti-colonial struggles, the North-South divide, and 
environmental injustice within and between nations.  By granting humanity 
formal equality (the same right to life, health, food, water, privacy, a healthy 
environment), human rights law erases the culpability of the North for poverty 
and environmental degradation in the South, and cloaks further acts of 
domination (such as “good governance” initiatives and “humanitarian” 
interventions) in the benevolent rhetoric of universality and common humanity.  
 
131. See BOYD, supra note 25, at 234-44; WESTON & BOLLIER, supra note 129, at 28-29, 87-97. 
132. See Makau Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 589, 604–07 (1996) 
[hereinafter Mutua, Ideology].  When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was negotiated, 
most African and Asian nations were absent from the discussions because they were under 
colonial rule. Id. at 605. 
133. See id. at 640-46. 
134. See BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS, AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE 206 (2003) [hereinafter RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW FROM BELOW]; Mutua, Ideology, supra note 132, at 607; Otto, supra note 91, at 5-7. 
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As Balakrishnan Rajagopal points out, the global North has gone out of its way 
to construct human rights as a “post-imperial discourse unsullied by the ugly 
colonial politics of pre-1948, when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) initiated the modern human rights movement.”135  Scholars like Mary 
Ann Glendon portray the UDHR as the culmination of a historical process, 
whereby the concerns of the poor and marginalized (states as well as peoples) 
triumphed over the interests of the mighty and powerful.136  However, on closer 
examination, the complicity of the human rights project with the colonial 
enterprise becomes evident: 
1) The UDHR did not apply directly to the colonial areas and 
was subjected to intense maneuvering by Britain at the drafting 
stage to prevent its application to its colonies despite Soviet 
pressure; 2) anticolonial struggles were hardly ever taken up for 
scrutiny at the UN Commission on Human Rights before many 
Third World states came on board in 1967, when membership 
was enlarged, and even then remained tangential on the agenda 
formally; 3) anti-colonial nationalist revolts in places such as 
Kenya and Malaya were successfully characterized by the 
British as ‘emergencies’ to be dealt with as law and order issues, 
thereby avoiding the application of either human rights or 
humanitarian law to these violent encounters; 4) the main anti-
imperial strand of human rights discourse—the critique of 
apartheid in South Africa and of Israeli policies in Palestinian 
territories using human rights terms by the Third World during 
the 1960s to 1980s—remained tangential to the mainstream 
human rights discourse coming from the West.137 
Environmental justice scholars and activists must recognize that human 
rights law is a malleable tool that can be used to obscure and perpetuate 
Northern domination or to subvert it.  In order to promote environmental justice 
through human rights law and advocacy, it is important to identify and 
challenge certain grand narratives that maintain Northern hegemony, including 
the tendency of Northern states and non-governmental organizations (the 
“saviors”) to target Southern states (the “savages”) for human rights violations 
without taking into account Northern complicity.138  For example, the criminal 
tribunals that prosecute genocide and crimes against humanity do not reach the 
former colonial powers that stoked ethnic conflict (such as France and Belgium 
in Rwanda), the states that aided and abetted repressive military regimes (such 
 
135. Rajagopal, Counter-Hegemonic International Law, supra note 5, at 769. 
136. MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 32-34 (2002). 
137. Rajagopal, Counter-Hegemonic International Law, supra note 5, at 769-70. 
138. See Mutua, Savages, Victims and Saviors, supra note 119, at 224-33. 
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as U.S. support of the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile), or the states and 
transnational corporations that benefited from civil wars and resource conflicts 
(such as the arms merchants and resource extractive industries in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo).139  A critical approach to environmental 
human rights law must lay bare the contemporary and historic causes of 
environmental human rights abuses, disrupt the savior-savage narrative, and 
ensure that the discourse and the practice of human rights address the deeper 
structural inequities that produce environmental injustice.   
Challenging the hegemony of the savior-savage narrative may entail, among 
other things, revisiting the official history of the human rights canon and 
exhuming information about the role of Southern countries in the negotiation, 
drafting, and approval by the UN General Assembly of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.140  Despite the popular view of Northern states as 
the architects of the UDHR, recent scholarship reveals a far more complex 
picture.141  Of the fifty-six countries that participated in the very public and 
highly contentious drafting process, Southern states were active and vocal in the 
negotiations, and were instrumental in the recognition of socioeconomic rights, 
women’s rights, and racial equality.142  Notwithstanding Eleanor Roosevelt’s 
leadership role, the U.S. delegation was ambivalent about the provisions 
forbidding racial discrimination and embracing socioeconomic rights, and the 
UDHR was unpopular in the United States.143  European delegates were also 
profoundly conflicted and divided.144  “Contrary to a belief that—ironically—has 
served hegemonic interests, the UDHR was not the brainchild of the great 
powers.  At best it was their stepchild.”145  Retrieving this history is an 
important step toward decolonizing and re-conceptualizing the human rights 
project and re-invigorating the economic, social, and cultural rights that were 
included in the human rights corpus due, in large part, to Southern insistence. 
 
139. See generally Ibrahim J. Gassama, A World Made of Violence and Misery: Human Rights as a 
Failed Project of Liberal Internationalism, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 407 (2012). 
140. See José-Manuel Barreto, Introduction: Decolonial Strategies and Dialogue in the Human Rights 
Field, in HUMAN RIGHTS FROM A THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVE: CRITIQUE, HISTORY AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 16-18 (José-Manuel Barreto ed., 2013) (discussing the need to decolonize 
human rights by examining the role of Asian, African, Muslim, communist, and Latin America 
countries in the development of the UDHR). 
141. See Susan Waltz, Universalizing Human Rights: The Role of Small States in the Construction of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS FROM A THIRD WORLD 
PERSPECTIVE: CRITIQUE, HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 353, 354. 
142. See id. at 358-61, 372-78, 382. 
143. See id. at 381-82. 
144. See id. at 382. 
145. Id. at 384. 
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Finally, a critical approach to the human rights canon should acknowledge 
that the discourse of human rights predates the UDHR and has deep roots in 
the struggles for liberty, equality, and self-determination of the peoples of Asia, 
Africa, and the Americas.146  
In this interpretation, events such as the Conquest of America, 
the independence gained by colonies throughout America in the 
Eighteenth  and Nineteenth centuries, the Mexican Revolution, 
the decolonisation of Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and the Middle 
East in the Twentieth Century, the Civil Rights Movement, the 
Cold War, the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the emergence of 
indigenous groups, social movements and entire peoples fighting 
today in the Global South against the policies of contemporary 
dictators, empires, transnational corporations and international 
financial institutions also have a place.147 
This alternative historical account rejects the Eurocentric framing of the human 
rights project articulated by both human rights proponents and critics, and 
recognizes the ways that marginalized communities have used the discourse of 
human rights to transform their societies.  According to the popular Eurocentric 
view, first generation human rights (civil and political rights) emerged from the 
French Revolution; second generation human rights (economic, social, and 
cultural rights) were recognized in the early twentieth century after the Russian 
Revolution and the implementation of social democracy in Europe; and third 
generation human rights (including the right to self-determination, the right to 
development, and the right to a healthy environment) did not emerge until the 
second half of the twentieth century.148  This generational framework not only 
purports to describe the evolution of human rights, but also is often understood 
to reflect the hierarchical priority of these rights.149  A narrative that recognizes 
the co-evolution of these generations of human rights in the course of both 
North-South anti-imperial struggles and a variety of local and transnational 
social justice movements breaks down these generational hierarchies, highlights 
the indivisibility of human rights, and gives Southern states and 
disenfranchised communities voice and agency in the advancement of the 
human rights project.150  De-colonizing the history of the human rights 
movement reveals that the architects of human rights are communities in 
 
146.  See José-Manuel Barreto, Imperialism and Decolonization as Scenarios of Human Rights History, 
in  HUMAN RIGHTS FROM A THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVE: CRITIQUE, HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 140, 140-41, 153-64 (José-Manuel Barreto ed., 2013). 
147.  Id. at 140-41. 
148.  See id. at 166-67. 
149.  See id. at 167. 
150.  See id. at 167-68. 
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struggle (including peoples struggling against colonial and post-colonial forms of 
domination), and disavows the savior-savage narrative of human rights as a 
“gift from the West to the rest of the world.”151   
B. Failure to Hold Northern States and Transnational Corporations 
Responsible for their Complicity in Human Rights Abuses in the 
South 
International human rights institutions, such as the international criminal 
tribunals discussed above, have generally failed to hold accountable the 
Northern states and corporations that are complicit in human rights and 
environmental abuses.  Human rights law generally operates vertically—giving 
citizens of a state a claim against their government.  However, as explained in 
Parts II and III of this article, nations in the global South are structurally 
dependent on the global North through international institutions (like the 
World Bank and the IMF), through the World Trade Organization (in which the 
South wields limited bargaining power), through international investment law 
(which often protects the interests of the foreign investor against those of the 
local citizens and the environment), and through the vast economic power of 
transnational corporations (TNCs).152  In order to grapple with environmental 
injustice both within and among nations, it is necessary to take into account the 
constellation of national and global actors that come together to produce these 
inequities.  National governments must be held accountable for their 
environmental human rights abuses, but it is also essential for human rights 
law to explicitly authorize claims against the actors in the global North (both 
states and TNCs) that wield vast economic power over these governments and 
are implicated in these abuses. 
One strategy to address this shortcoming is the evolution of human rights law 
(via treaty/legislation, soft law, litigation, or interpretation by human rights 
bodies) to explicitly recognize and enforce what John Knox, the United Nations 
Independent Expert on Human Rights and the Environment, calls diagonal 
human rights.  Diagonal human rights are rights held by individuals against 
foreign governments for the extraterritorial consequences of actions taken by 
those governments directly (such as constructing dams or power plants) or 
indirectly (through the power they wield in international financial institutions 
 
151.  See id. at 168; BAXI, supra note 37, at 234-35. 
152. See VIJAY PRASHAD, THE POORER NATIONS: A POSSIBLE HISTORY OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH 256 
(2012); Saito, supra note 89, at 6. 
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like the IMF and the World Bank, or through financing or failing to regulate the 
conduct of TNCs).153    
The United Nations Charter imposes diagonal or extraterritorial obligations 
on all states by requiring international cooperation to ensure the realization of 
human rights.  Pursuant to Article 56 of the UN Charter, “[a]ll Members pledge 
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the 
Organization” to achieve the purposes set forth in Article 55 of the Charter.154  
These purposes include “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, 
or religion.”155 
In addition to the obligations imposed by the UN Charter, some human rights 
treaties, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), have been interpreted by UN bodies to impose 
specific extraterritorial obligations.156  For example, article 2(1) of the ICESCR 
requires states parties “to take steps, individually and through international 
assistance and cooperation .  .  . with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization” of the rights recognized in the treaty.157  The UN Committee on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the body responsible for 
overseeing the ICESCR, has relied on this language to conclude that states 
parties have extraterritorial obligations with respect to the rights to food, water, 
and health.158  This includes the duty to refrain from interfering with the 
enjoyment of these rights in other countries;159 the duty to prevent their own 
citizens and enterprises from violating these rights in other countries;160 and the 
obligation to fulfill these rights in other countries by facilitating access or 
 
153. See John Knox, Diagonal Environmental Rights, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS 82, 82-83 (Mark Gibney & Sigrun Skogly eds., 2010) [hereinafter 
Knox, Diagonal Environmental Rights]; Gonzalez, Critique, supra note 129, at 786-89 (discussing 
the responsibility of Northern states for extraterritorial harms resulting from policies imposed 
through the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, and regional trade agreements). 
154. See U.N. Charter art. 56. 
155. Id. at art. 55. 
156. See Knox, Diagonal Environmental Rights, supra note 153, at 88-89.   
157. U.N. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3. Similarly, Article 23 of the ICESCR calls for “international action for the 
achievement of the rights recognized in the present Covenant.” Id. at art. 23.  
158. See Knox, Diagonal Environmental Rights, supra note 153, at 88. 
159. See U.N. Commission on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment 12: 
The Right to Adequate Food, ¶¶ 15, 36, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999) [hereinafter 
General Comment 12]; CESCR, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter General Comment 
14]; CESCR, General Comment 15: The Right to Water, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 
2003) [hereinafter General Comment 15]. 
160. See General Comment 12, supra note 159, at ¶¶15, 36; General Comment 14, supra note 159, at ¶ 
39; General Comment 15, supra note 159, at ¶ 33. 
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providing the necessary aid.161  States parties must also ensure that the rights 
to food, water, and health are “given due attention in the negotiation of 
international agreements,” and should consider the development of additional 
legal instruments for this purpose.162  Finally, the CESCR, in its interpretation 
of the rights to water and health, has explicitly determined that states parties 
should ensure that international and regional agreements (including trade 
liberalization agreements) and the practices of international financial 
institutions (such as the World Bank and the IMF) do not adversely impact the 
realization of the these rights.163 
In 2011, an eminent group of human rights experts (including former and 
current Special Rapporteurs of the UN Human Rights Council) adopted a series 
of principles, known as the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations 
of States in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, that enumerate 
and explain the extraterritorial obligations of states under existing 
international law.164  These extraterritorial obligations include the duty to 
ensure that international organizations to which a state belongs (such as the 
IMF and the World Bank) act in accordance with pre-existing human rights 
obligations;165 the duty to elaborate, interpret, and apply international 
agreements (including free trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties) 
in a manner consistent with human rights obligations;166 and the duty to ensure 
that non-state actors (such as TNCs) do not impair human rights in other 
countries.167 
An example of a diagonal or extraterritorial human rights claim is the 
petition filed by the Inuit against the United States before the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights for human rights violations caused by climate 
 
161. See General Comment 12, supra note 159, at  ¶¶ 15, 36; General Comment 14, supra note 159, at ¶ 
39; General Comment 15, supra note 159, at ¶ 34.   
162. See General Comment 12, supra note 159, at ¶ 36; General Comment 14, supra note 159, at ¶ 39; 
General Comment 15, supra note 159, at ¶ 35. 
163. See General Comment 14, supra note 159, at ¶ 39; General Comment 15, supra note 159, at ¶¶ 35, 
36. 
164. See The ETO Consortium, Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the 
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Jan. 2013), available at 
http://www.etoconsortium.org/en/library/maastricht-principles/ [hereinafter Maastricht 
Principles]; see also Olivier de Schutter et al., Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 34 
HUM. RTS. Q. 1084 (2012) [hereinafter Commentary to the Maastricht Principles]. 
165. See Maastricht Principles, supra note 164, at Principle 15; Commentary to the Maastricht 
Principles, supra note 164, at 1118-20. 
166. See Maastricht Principles, supra note 164, at Principle 17; Commentary to the Maastricht 
Principles, supra note 164, at 1122-24. 
167. See Maastricht Principles, supra note 164, at Principle 24; Commentary to the Maastricht 
Principles, supra note 164, at 1134-37. 
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change.168  The petition alleged that the United States, by failing to take 
meaningful action to curtail its greenhouse gas emissions, had violated the 
human rights of the Inuit in both Canada and the United States under the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, including the rights to 
life, health, property, culture, physical integrity, security, residence, and 
movement; the right to use and enjoy their ancestral lands; and the right to 
subsistence.169  While the claims of the Inuit residing in the United States were 
vertical (against the state in which they reside), those of the Canadian Inuit 
were diagonal (against a foreign government).170  Because the Commission 
refused to process the claim on the grounds that it could not determine whether 
the alleged facts were sufficient to constitute a violation of the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Commission over diagonal human rights claim was not resolved—
leaving the door open to future claims of this nature.171    
 
168. See Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations 
Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States (Dec. 7, 
2005), available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ICC_Petition_7Dec05.pdf [hereinafter Inuit 
Petition]. 
169. See id. at 74-95; Sara C. Arminzadeh, A Moral Imperative: The Human Rights Implications of 
Climate Change, 30 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 231, 238–58 (2007) (analyzing the impacts of 
climate change on the human rights of the Inuit and on small island developing states); 
Marguerite E. Middaugh, Linking Global Warming to Inuit Human Rights, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. 
J. 179, 182-208 (2006) (examining the Inuit’s human rights claims under the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man); Sarah Nuffer, Human Rights Violations and 
Climate Change: The Last Days of the Inuit People?, 37 RUTGERS L. REC. 182, 189-91 (2010) 
(discussing the claims in the Inuit petition). 
170. Although the Inuit residing in Greenland and Russia were also affected by climate change, 
the Inuit petition was limited to Inuit residing in the United States and Canada because the 
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is limited to the Americas. 
Furthermore, the petition relied on the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
rather than the American Convention on Human Rights because the United States is not a 
party to the American Convention. See generally Inuit Petition, supra note 168; Hari M. 
Osofsky, Complexities of Addressing the Impacts of Climate Change on Indigenous Peoples 
Through International Law Petitions: A Case Study of the Inuit Petition to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: THE SEARCH 
FOR LEGAL REMEDIES 313, 313-38 (Randall Abate & Elizabeth Ann Kronk eds., 2013). Both 
the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have held 
that the American Declaration, although adopted as a declaration rather than a binding 
treaty, nevertheless creates international obligations for members of the Organization of 
American States. Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶¶ 35, 45 (July 14, 1989). 
171. See Letter from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of the American 
States, to Paul Crowley regarding the Inuit Petition (Nov. 16, 2006), available at 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/science/16commissionletter.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 
2014) (“The information provided does not enable us to determine whether the alleged facts would 
tend to characterize a violation of rights protected by the American Declaration.”); Knox, Diagonal 
Environmental Rights, supra note 153, at 88-89, 90-91. 
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An important strategy to promote diagonal human rights is holding 
governments accountable for failure to regulate the conduct of their corporations 
abroad.  Under the ICESCR, states have an obligation to ensure that 
corporations under their jurisdiction and control do not violate economic, social, 
and cultural rights in other countries.172  If a state neglects to exercise due 
diligence to prevent such violations, then it may be liable on that basis.173  
Similarly, capital exporting countries (in the North or the South) that enter into 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with capital importing countries may be 
liable for the human rights violations of their TNCs to the extent that the BITs 
restrict the ability of the capital importing country to regulate the foreign 
investor in a manner that protects environmental human rights.174  Indeed, 
these BITs as well as the host state agreements (HGAs) between the foreign 
investor and the Southern state should contain legally binding human rights 
and environmental obligations and provide for the enforcement of these 
provisions in both the home state and the host state (including civil actions by 
persons injured due to the acts or decisions of the foreign investor).175 
Finally, efforts to promote environmental human rights must address the 
accountability of corporations for human rights violations.  While a complete 
discussion of the legal strategies that might be pursued to achieve corporate 
accountability is beyond the scope of this article, possible approaches include 
 
172. See Robert McCorquodale & Penelope Simons, Responsibility Beyond Borders: State 
Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law, 
70 MOD. L. REV. 598, 617-19 (2007); Maastricht Principles, supra note 164, at Principles 23-27; 
Commentary to the Maastricht Principles, supra note 164, at 1133-45. 
173. See McCorquodale & Simons, supra note 172, at 619-21. Northern states sometimes justify their 
failure to regulate the conduct of their corporations abroad on the ground that such regulation 
would constitute “an imperialistic infringement of host state sovereignty.” See Sara L. Seck, 
Unilateral Home State Regulation: Imperialism or Tool for Subaltern Resistance?, 46 OSGOODE 
HALL L.J. 565, 566 (2008). Given the history of Northern intervention in Southern nations for the 
benefit of Northern transnational corporations, this rationale, as Sara Seck acknowledges, 
amounts to a cruel hoax—“a denial of responsibility.” Id. at 585. Nevertheless, an environmental 
justice approach to home state regulation must be cognizant of the North’s imperial interventions 
in the South and advocate extraterritorial regulation only to “facilitate the coexistence between 
states and their cooperation in addressing situations that are of concern to more than one or . . . to 
the international community as a whole.” See Commentary to the Maastricht Principles, supra 
note 164, at 1138-39. In other words, extraterritorial regulation is appropriate to protect the 
human rights of the local communities affected by the conduct of foreign corporations in the host 
state, and must not be used to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states in violation of the 
UN Charter or other international law instruments or principles. See id. at 1134-42. 
174. McCorquodale & Simons, supra note 172, at 621-23; Maastricht Principles, supra note 164, at 
Principle 17; Commentary to the Maastricht Principles, supra note 164, at 1122-24. 
175. See KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE, ENVIRONMENT AND 
THE SAFEGUARDING OF CAPITAL 348-70 (2013) (describing the provisions of model Bilateral 
Investment Treaties designed to promote human rights and sustainable development); Simons, 
supra note 3, at 18, 43. 
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enhancing the human rights enforcement capacity of Southern countries, 
strengthening the mechanisms available in the home state to adjudicate human 
rights violations abroad, and developing treaties that impose human rights 
obligations directly on corporations. 
In 2003, the United Nations draft Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights proposed the direct imposition of human rights obligations on 
TNCs.176  However, under intense pressure from corporate interests, the state 
members of the former UN Human Rights Commission rejected this 
approach.177  Several years later, the United Nations Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and other Business Enterprises (Professor John G. Ruggie) 
developed a governance framework and a set of Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights that focused on building the capacity of states to regulate 
TNCs and included only non-binding norms for corporations (except the binding 
obligation to comply with international criminal law).178  Critics of the Ruggie 
framework described this approach as “the abandonment . . . of an international 
legal approach to the problem of corporate impunity in favour of soft norms and 
private self-regulation.”179   
Given the difficulties encountered by Northern and Southern states in 
regulating the conduct of TNCs (including the diminished governance capacity 
of Southern states due to the Northern interventions described in Parts II and 
III of this article),180 it is essential to continue to advocate for enforceable 
human rights obligations against corporate actors.  From the colonial period to 
 
176. See U.N. Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Protection of Hum. Rts., 55th Sess., Draft Norms 
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (May 30, 2003); U.N.  Sub-
Comm’n on the Promotion and Protection of Hum. Rts., 55th Sess., Commentary on the 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises 
with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (2003). 
177. See PENELOPE SIMONS & AUDREY MACKLIN, THE GOVERNANCE GAP: EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES, 
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE HOME STATE ADVANTAGE 3 (2014). 
178. See U.N. Human Rights Council, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and 
Human Rights, Rep. of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Entities, 8th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/8/5 (April 7, 2008); U.N. Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Rep. 
of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 
(Mar. 21, 2011), available at http://www.businesshumanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/ 
ruggie-guiding-principles-21-mar-2011.pdf. 
179. See SIMONS & MACKLIN, supra note 177, at 3. 
180. See id. at 7-8 
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the present, international law and domestic law have been deployed to promote 
foreign trade and investment and to limit the ability of states to regulate 
transnational corporations.181  Because the rights and protections available to 
corporate actors were created by law, it is only appropriate to address the 
impunity of transnational corporations for their extraterritorial environmental 
human rights violations by negotiating multilateral treaties imposing human 
rights obligations on these enterprises.182  In June 2014, the UN Human Rights 
Council approved a resolution establishing an intergovernmental working group 
to develop a legally binding instrument imposing human rights obligations on 
corporations.183  While powerful Northern states will undoubtedly resist and 
reject such a treaty, the resolution represents an important step toward a legal 
framework that will “begin to shift the balance of power between transnational 
corporate actors on the one hand, and Third World host states and victims of 
corporate human rights abuses on the other.”184 
C. The Challenge of Collective Human Rights 
One of the hallmarks of environmental justice movements is their emphasis 
on communitarian notions of justice.185  Human rights law, with its emphasis on 
individual rights, may be ill-suited to the task of advancing the collective rights 
of indigenous peoples, racial and ethnic minorities, and other subordinated 
communities disparately burdened by environmental degradation.  For example, 
the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) has generally adopted an 
individualistic approach to environmental human rights rather than viewing 
the environment as a public good that affects the collective well-being of groups 
of people residing in a particular location.186  In the case of Kyrtatos v. Greece, 
which involved the illegal draining of a wetland, the Court held that the crucial 
element in determining whether the conduct in question violated the applicants’ 
rights under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (the European Convention) “is the existence of a 
harmful effect on a person’s private or family sphere, and not simply the general 
 
181. Simons, supra note 3, at 35; SIMONS & MACKLIN, supra note 175, at 8. 
182. See Simons, supra note 3, at 40-43; MILES, supra note 175, at 368-70. 
183.   See U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, 26th 
Sess., UN Doc. A/HRC/L.22/Rev.1 (June 25, 2014). 
184. Simons, supra note 3, at 41. 
185.  See David Schlosberg, Theorising Environmental Justice: the Expanding Sphere of a Discourse, 22 
ENVTL. POL. 37, 42-43 (2013). 
186. See Francesco Francioni, International Human Rights in an Environmental Horizon, 21 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 41, 50–51 (2010). 
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deterioration of the environment.  Neither Article 8 nor any of the other Articles 
of the Convention are specifically designed to provide general protection of the 
environment as such.”187  In 2012, the Council of Europe produced a manual 
that provides practical guidance on the evolving environmental jurisprudence of 
the Court under the European Convention and the European Charter.188  
Confirming the Court’s restrictive view of environmental human rights, the 
manual states that “[n]either the Convention nor the Charter are designed to 
provide a general protection of the environment as such and do not expressly 
guarantee a right to a sound, quiet and healthy environment.”189  Critics of the 
European approach have argued that the Court’s jurisprudence fails to value 
environmental integrity for society as a whole, “but only as a criterion to 
measure the negative impact on a given individual’s life, property, private and 
family life.”190   
However, the case law emerging from the Inter-American human rights 
system, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and even the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopts a much more 
collective approach to environmental human rights.  For example, in Mayagna 
(Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights invalidated logging concessions awarded by Nicaragua to foreign 
investors in the ancestral lands of the indigenous Awas Tingni community on 
the basis of collective property rights.191  In Saramaka People v. Suriname, the 
Inter-American Court used this rationale to protect the collective property 
rights of an Afro-descendant community.192  In Social and Economic Rights 
Action Centre v. Nigeria (the Ogoniland case), the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights concluded that the devastation wrought by 
petroleum extraction violated the Ogoni people’s collective right to a healthy 
environment.193  Finally, in Lubikon Lake Band v. Canada and in Francis Hopy 
 
187. See Kyrtatos v. Greece, 2003-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 257, ¶ 52, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
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Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶¶ 148-49 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at 
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Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶ 88, 93-95, 99-103 (Nov. 28, 2007), available at 
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and Tepoaitu Bessert v. France, the UN Human Rights Committee upheld the 
petitioners’ contention that the challenged development projects (oil and gas 
extraction and tourist development, respectively) imposed an unacceptable 
burden on traditional lands and subsistence systems of indigenous communities 
as a whole (and not just individual members of the group) in violation of Articles 
27 (minority rights) and 17 (protection of family and private life) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.194   
In short, historically marginalized communities in the global South and the 
global North have successfully vindicated collective human rights in regional 
human rights bodies.  These victories illustrate the emancipatory potential of 
environmental human rights law and advocacy and the ability of the human 
rights system to progress and evolve in response to the demands of grassroots 
environmental justice movements.   
D. Anthropocentrism, the Domination of Nature, and the Rights of 
Future Generations 
Human rights law is, by definition, anthropocentric, and may therefore 
universalize the Northern development model based on the domination of 
nature.  Many scholars have argued that the root of the present environmental 
crisis is the globalization of the Western ideology that separates humans from 
nature and regards nature in purely instrumental terms.195  Human rights law 
has also tended to focus on present generations and to neglect the rights of 
future generations.196  While a full discussion of anthropocentricism and future 
generations is beyond the scope of this article, it is important to recognize that 
many of the indigenous peoples who were constructed as “uncivilized” and in 
need of “development” possess legal systems based on a sophisticated 
understanding of the relationship between humans and nature and a concern 
for the impact of present economic activity on future generations.197  While 
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DECOLONIAL OPTIONS 12-13 (2011); Peter Burdon, The Jurisprudence of Thomas Berry, 15 
WORLDVIEW 151, 152-54 (2011); Geisinger, supra note 82, at 44-46; WESTON & BOLLIER, supra 
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indigenous peoples and nature). 
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people do not always behave in accordance with their values and traditions, 
these indigenous legal systems can nevertheless provide the foundation for a 
more robust conception of human rights that acknowledges the interdependence 
of humans and nature and promotes intergenerational equity.  For example, 
Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution became the first national constitution to provide for 
the rights of nature, based on the principle of sumac kawsay, the Kichwa 
concept of living in harmony with others and with nature (known in Spanish as 
el buen vivir, or living well).198  In 2012, Bolivia promulgated the Law of Mother 
Earth and Integral Development for Living Well, which likewise recognizes the 
rights of nature.199  That same year, New Zealand granted legal personhood to 
its longest navigable river, the Whanganui, in a major step toward the 
resolution of the historic grievances of Māori peoples.200  Several countries, 
including Bolivia, Ecuador, Germany, Norway, Kenya, and South Africa, have 
recognized the rights of future generations in their constitutions.201  These legal 
reforms do not obviate the tension between the rights of humans and nature, 
but they do “shift individual and collective perceptions of nature, as something 
with integrity and value,”202 thereby increasing the likelihood of more 
thoughtful decisions regarding human activities that impact the environment 
and the well-being of generations to come. 
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the concept of el buen vivir). 
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E. Lack of Redress for Systemic Harms 
Human rights law is generally designed to provide redress for human rights 
violations with definite, identifiable perpetrators and victims, but may be ill-
equipped to handle the North’s ecological debt to the South for centuries of 
colonial exploitation (including slavery) and decades of “modernization” and 
“development.”203  While the North’s overconsumption of the planet’s resources 
and externalization of the social and environmental costs of economic activity 
have undoubtedly violated the environmental human rights of billions of human 
beings, proving these human rights violations would be challenging in a highly 
globalized economy with complex supply chains.  It would be difficult to identify 
specific perpetrators and establish causal links between the conduct and the 
harm in a manner that takes into account historic and current responsibility as 
well as historic, current, and future impacts of the offending conduct.  Indeed, 
the UN Human Rights Council, in its 2009 report on human rights and climate 
change, made similar observations about the difficulty of establishing liability 
for climate change.204  The North’s refusal to accept responsibility for its historic 
greenhouse gas emissions continues to be one of the major stumbling blocks in 
the climate change negotiations.205 
Rather than forsaking claims for systemic harm based on human rights law 
or other applicable bodies of international law, environmental justice advocates 
should carefully parse the existing legal frameworks and identify cracks in the 
edifice that would allow these claims to proceed.  For example, Maxine Burkett, 
in her contribution to this symposium, argues that certain provisions in the 
climate change adaptation framework support the creation of a compensation 
mechanism for the rehabilitation of small island states harmed by unavoidable, 
irreversible, and slow-onset events such as sea level rise, ocean acidification, 
and drought.206  Similarly, in March 2014, a group of Caribbean nations 
 
203. For an insightful discussion of some of the challenges associated with imposing liability for 
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announced that they had hired a British human rights law firm to sue several 
European states (including Britain, France, and the Netherlands) in order to 
obtain reparations for slavery, such as a formal apology, cancellation of the 
foreign debt, and monetary compensation.207  Whether or not these strategies 
are ultimately successful, they will influence public perceptions of historic and 
contemporary inequities, clarify extremely significant areas of international law, 
and create political momentum for redress to the victims of systemic injustice.   
An example of an innovative (and ultimately successful) claim for 
environmental harm caused by a former colonial power is the case brought in 
1989 by the Pacific island nation of Nauru before the International Court of 
Justice.  Nauru sought reparations from Australia for environmental damage 
caused by phosphate mining during Australia’s administration of Nauru 
pursuant to the League of Nations Mandate System and its successor 
Trusteeship System of the United Nations.208  Nauru alleged that Australia 
violated the trusteeship provisions and several principles of international law, 
including self-determination and permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources.209  In 1993, Nauru and Australia settled the claim for $107 million 
under an agreement designed to rehabilitate the damaged lands.210  The Nauru 
case illustrates the importance of creative use of existing legal doctrines to 
address environmental injustice.  
F. Treating Symptoms Rather than Root Causes 
The human rights framework tends to mitigate the harshness of the global 
economy without questioning its fundamental premises.211  It protects the rights 
of specific individuals and communities on a case-by-case basis rather than 
challenging paradigms of economic development that impose disproportionate 
burdens on the planet’s most vulnerable communities.  The case-by-case 
approach can implicitly legitimize the existing distributions of wealth and power 
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by dealing with environmental injustice as aberrant rather than recognizing it 
as systemic.  Tinkering with the discrete manifestations of injustice may divert 
attention from efforts to challenge a failed development model based on the 
myth of unlimited economic growth and externalization of environmental and 
social costs.  
For example, indigenous peoples have been particularly successful in 
influencing the substantive content of international law through their 
participation in both formal and informal decision-making and norm-creating 
processes in regional and global law-making institutions.212  However, these 
human rights victories have not always translated into success on the ground 
due to the fragmented nature of international law and the failure of 
international economic law to incorporate human rights norms.  States and 
TNCs continue to violate the rights of indigenous peoples by engaging in 
environmentally devastating activities (including oil drilling and mining) on 
indigenous ancestral lands against the express wishes of these communities.213  
As one observer points out: 
[I]ndigenous peoples’ human rights over their ancestral lands 
and resources often collide with pre-existing international law 
norms and other norms that continuously evolve under 
international trade and investment law.  Indigenous peoples’ 
rights over ancestral lands and resources exist outside of, and 
arguably in subordination to, other norms of international law 
such as state sovereignty over natural resources and states’ 
right to development.  Moreover, corporate actors that benefit 
from state-granted concessions may be considered to have more 
rights over lands and resources than indigenous peoples that 
occupy such lands.214 
Thus, while continuing to advance environmental human rights in national, 
regional, and international human rights bodies, environmental justice 
movements in the North and the South must also engage vigorously with 
international economic law and institutions if the triumphs achieved in the 
human rights regime are to be more than pyrrhic victories.215  Environmental 
justice advocates must question the dominant economic paradigms and propose 
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alternatives that will place the interdependence of humans and nature at the 
core and will promote environmental justice within and between nations.   
G. Displacement of Local Conceptions of Human Dignity 
Finally, one of the dangers of invoking international human rights law is that 
it may crowd out competing visions of justice and human dignity.216  As 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal explains: 
The epistemological problem is the sheer assertion of power over, 
and the elimination of, other discourses which may or may not 
come from the same source as the Western liberal human rights 
paradigm . . . .  The empirical problem relates to the wide gap 
that exists between the legal instantiations of rights to the lived 
experience of rights, where one encounters the complex reality 
that there are multiple sources of resistance, emancipation, 
flourishing, protest and rights-making practices on the ground 
that are competing and coexisting, and that the human rights 
discourse is only one language of justice and emancipation.217 
In other words,  human rights norms often fail to adequately reflect the 
complex and multi-dimensional forms of violence inflicted on subaltern 
populations,218  to fully articulate the emancipatory aspirations and resistance 
strategies of diverse grassroots social and environmental justice movements,219 
and to represent the world views of non-Western legal and cultural traditions 
(including Islamic, African, Buddhist, Confucian, Hindu, and indigenous notions 
of what it means to be human).220  In addition, as noted above, the redress 
mechanisms of the international human rights system may be unwilling or 
unable to provide reparations for systemic injustices such as slavery, 
colonialism, and the North’s ecological debt to the South. 
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One response to these critiques is to recognize that the human rights 
framework, despite its limitations, has nevertheless empowered vulnerable 
populations disparately burdened by environmental degradation.  Poor 
communities in places as diverse as Russia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Argentina, 
Chile, Romania, Turkey, Peru, and South Africa have deployed environmental 
human rights to obtain access to clean drinking water or to address health risks 
posed by industrial pollution.221  It is important for legal scholars to supplement 
theoretical critiques of environmental human rights with empirical studies of 
environmental justice struggles in order to evaluate the actual operation of 
human rights norms and institutions and their ability to fulfill the aspirations 
of subordinated communities.222 
A second response is to highlight the ways that national and regional 
interpretations of environmental human rights will inevitably be influenced by 
local conceptions of human dignity that will supplement or perhaps replace 
Eurocentric “universal” models.223  For example, both the Ecuadoran 
Constitution and Bolivia’s Law of Mother Earth recognize the rights of nature 
due, in part, to the incorporation of indigenous values and traditions into the 
domestic legal system.224  Similarly, New Zealand’s decision to grant legal 
personhood to the Whanganui River reflects a rapprochement between Western 
and indigenous legal philosophies.225  At the regional level, the African Charter 
of Human and Peoples’ Rights (which recognizes the right to a healthy 
environment) emphasizes both the rights and duties of individuals consistent 
with African conceptions of human beings as integral members of a larger 
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community.226  This group-centered view of humanity is also evident in national 
legal systems.  Thus, South African public law, private law, and constitutional 
interpretation have all been influenced by the indigenous concept of ubuntu, a 
holistic view of human identity as interconnected with the environment and 
with other persons.227   
A third response is to acknowledge that environmental human rights, if they 
are to fulfill their emancipatory potential, must evolve under pressure from 
social movements that genuinely reflect the experiences, aspirations, and 
perspectives of subaltern communities.  The discourse of environmental justice, 
understood not as a universal language, but as one inflected with local accents, 
values, and vocabularies, can provide social movements with a language of 
resistance that has not been coopted by international law-making processes and 
institutions.228  For example, environmental justice can be invoked to demand 
corrective justice in the form of reparations for historic injustice and systemic 
violations of human rights (including reparations for slavery, colonialism, and 
the North’s ecological debt to the South) in order to stimulate the development 
of legal theories that will provide this relief.229  Similarly, environmental justice 
can be deployed to demand not just the minimum entitlements necessary for a 
decent life (as currently envisioned by the dominant interpretation of economic, 
social and cultural rights),230 but distributional justice in the form of an equal 
per capita entitlement to the planet’s resources consistent with ecological 
limits.231  The end product of this approach would be convergence in the 
ecological footprint of persons in the North and the South—and also within each 
nation.232  Environmental justice can be used to devise legal and extra-legal 
strategies to demand a more just and sustainable economic order and to 
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influence the development of environmental human rights at the national, 
regional, and international level.   
In sum, far from casting doubt on the utility of the environmental human 
rights framework, the limitations discussed in this section only highlight the 
importance of political mobilization to create new rights and obligations and to 
deploy existing rights in novel and creative ways.  Human rights law and 
discourse must be regarded as a tool to challenge environmental injustice rather 
than an ossified and unchanging body of law.  Thus, in its 2004 report on 
environmental human rights, Friends of the Earth International unabashedly 
calls for reparations for the ecological debt caused by the North’s depletion and 
destruction of the South’s natural resources and highlights the plight of 
communities affected by environmental degradation.233  Human rights law puts 
a human face on environmental harm and empowers subordinated communities 
to speak for themselves in domestic or international tribunals and in the court 
of public opinion, as a means of naming and shaming human rights abusers and 
drawing international attention to their own plight and that of similarly 
situated communities.234  In doing so, it serves as a powerful tool to educate the 
public about environmental injustice (current and historic), to build political 
momentum for reparations, and to create a public dialogue about alternatives to 
the current growth-at-any-cost economic model.  As one commentator points out,  
[E]nvironmental activists see human rights as fluid and (in a 
good way) volatile and unstable.  Unlike the lawyers they roam 
beyond the documentation to find new rights.  Unlike the 
philosophers they do not pass their projects through a test rooted 
in historical or rational consistency.  What matters is what 
works and what can be achieved.235   
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Conclusion 
This article has highlighted what one observer calls “the paradox of 
institutionalization.”236  On the one hand, the discourse of human rights 
possesses tremendous emancipatory potential when deployed by grassroots 
environmental justice movements to advocate for a more equitable and 
sustainable society. On the other hand, human rights law and institutions are 
embedded in power relations that replicate colonial discourses (such as the 
savior-savage narrative) and enable Northern states and transnational 
corporations to evade responsibility for their abuse of nature and of vulnerable 
states and peoples.  In order to realize the emancipatory potential of 
environmental human rights, scholars and practitioners should develop a non-
Eurocentric account of the human rights project, amplify the voices of grassroots 
environmental justice activists to influence the interpretation of environmental 
human rights law, and develop legal theories that challenge the systemic 
human rights violations of the global economic order rather than merely 
ameliorating its most egregious manifestations.  Environmental human rights 
litigation must target not only Southern states, but also the Northern states and 
TNCs that wield enormous power over the policies and practices of Southern 
governments.  Human rights law must recognize and vigorously enforce 
collective human rights, the rights of nature, and the rights of future 
generations.  It must evolve in response to the needs and aspirations of 
grassroots social justice movements, and incorporate local and indigenous 
concepts of human dignity.  In the words of Upendra Baxi: 
The summons for the destruction of ‘narrative monopolies’ in 
human rights theory and practice is of enormous importance, as 
it enables us to recognize that the authorship of human rights 
rests with communities in struggle against illegitimate power 
formations and the politics of cruelty.  The local, not the global, 
it needs to be emphasized, remains the crucial site of struggle for 
the enunciation, implementation, and enjoyment and exercise of 
human rights.  The pre-history of almost every global 
institutionalization of human rights is furnished everywhere by 
the local.237  
Human rights law is by no means a panacea for the world’s environmental 
ills, but it is an important tool in a broader campaign for global environmental 
justice that complements but does not replace domestic environmental 
regulation, the negotiation and implementation of environmental treaties, and 
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extra-legal popular mobilization for a more just, humane, and ecologically 
sustainable economic order.  
  

